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COURTS, STATUTES, AND PUBLIC POLICY:

THE CASE OF THE MURDEROUS HEIR
Daniel A. Farber*

RANCIS Palmer died of strychnine poisoning on April 25, 1882,
murdered by his sixteen-year-old grandson, Elmer.' This family
tragedy would not have caused any legal perplexity except for one
additional circumstance. Elmer was (not coincidentally) the main beneficiary under his grandfather's will.2 Could Elmer inherit from the man he
murdered? Following what they considered the letter of the law, the
lower New York courts ruled in Elmer's favor. But in an unprecedented
ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed, denying Elmer his inheritance because of the injustice of allowing him to benefit from his crime. 3
Although the result may seem commonsensical, there was a vigorous dissent, and an earlier North Carolina case had gone the other way. 4 Ever
since Riggs v. Palmerwas decided, scholars have debated whether it was a
usurpation of legislative power or a triumph of principle over technicality.
Almost from the beginning, Riggs has fascinated students of jurisprudence, including many legal luminaries. Among others, Riggs attracted
the attention of Pound, 5 Cardozo, 6 Hart and Sacks, 7 Dworkin, 8 and Posner. 9 And little wonder: The case arose near the beginning of what has
proved to be an age of statutes. 10 It vividly poses perennial questions
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research,
University of Minnesota. Thanks to Carol Chomsky, Mary Lou Fellows, Phil Frickey, and
Gil Grantmore for helpful suggestions.
1. See Brief for Appellants at 2, Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
2. See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 188. Further details can be found in Section I below.
3. See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191.
4. See Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888) and infra text accompanying notes 1720.
5. See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1907).
Pound argued vigorously against the ruling, no doubt alarmed that it opened the door for
judicial resistance to progressive legislation. A few years earlier, in a precursor to Lochner,
the author of the majority opinion had struck down an anti-sweatshop law. See In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
6. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40-43

(1921).
7. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 68-102 (1994). Hart and Sacks use
the Riggs problem as the basis for a probing analysis of the relationship between judgemade law and legislation.
8. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23-39 (1977). For further discussion of Dworkin's views, see infra text and accompanying note 47.
9. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 105-07 (1990).
10. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-7 (1982).
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about the judicial role after this statutory eclipse of the common law. Is
the judicial role in developing public policy condemned to wither in the
shadow of the legislature? Or do courts still have their own part to play
in the search for justice? Even today, judges and scholars continue to
struggle with these questions, sometimes with results that do not compare
very favorably with Riggs."
Now, some eleven decades after Riggs, seems an appropriate time to
take stock of its continuing significance. After a close look at the case
itself and its impact on legal doctrine, this essay will examine the implications of Riggs in three settings. The first is the jurisprudential dispute
between H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin over how courts fill gaps in
legal rules. Hart believes that judges must reach outside the law to fill
gaps, acting much like legislatures, while Dworkin thinks they are guided
by specifically legal principles. The second setting is the ongoing debate
over statutory interpretation. 12 Although the debate is complex, at a
crude level it can be seen as a contest between those favoring the letter
and others favoring the spirit of the law. Riggs appears to be a good test
case for the "new textualism," though as we will see, that appearance may
be deceiving. Third is the relation between common law and legislation.
Now that so much law is statutory, the viability of judge-made law is unclear. To what extent has the common law become an anachronism in
this age of statutes? All three issues involve, loosely speaking, a clash
between formalism and pragmatism. The goal here is not to resolve that
clash, but to assess the relevance of Riggs to the contending positions.
One reason that Riggs has attracted so much scholarly attention for so
long is that it can be viewed in several perspectives, seeming to speak to
different jurisprudential issues. Little did Francis Palmer know what
large issues of legal theory would be put in play by his death.
I.

RIGGS AND THE SLAYER RULE

The plot summary of Riggs is simple: grandpa makes will, boy kills
grandpa. Although this simplistic version of the case is enough to raise
the basic legal issue, a deeper understanding of the case and its context is
helpful. We will begin with a closer look at the case as it came before the
New York Court of Appeals, then analyze how the Court of Appeals handled the case, and finally put the case in context within the law of trusts
and estates.
Although somewhat more complex than the one-sentence summary
11. For discussion of some parallel contemporary issues, see infra text and accompanying notes 37-45.
12. For an overview, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed.
1995). A useful comparative study can be found in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
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above, the facts of Riggs are relatively straightforward. 13 Two years
before his death, Francis made a will leaving two small bequests to his
daughters (one of them Mrs. Riggs). The remainder of his estate was to
go to Elmer, who was living with Francis as part of the family. (We know
nothing of Elmer's parents. Perhaps he was an orphan.) The will also
provided support for his mother, Susan, from the income of a farm owned
by Francis. If Elmer survived Francis but later died while still underage
and without any family of his own, the property would next go to the two
daughters. As estate plans go, this was a simple one.
Francis was a widower at the time of the will, but he later remarried. A
prenuptial agreement required him to amend his will to provide support
from the farm for his new wife. Just two months later, Elmer murdered
him to prevent him from changing his will. Elmer was only sixteen at the
time. He was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to the
reformatory. The will was duly admitted to probate. The two daughters
filed suit for an injunction to prevent him from taking the property.
Surprisingly, the issue of inheritance by the testator's murderer seems
never to have been the subject of a reported opinion until shortly before
Riggs.1 4 (Maybe, in those days of swift and widespread capital punishment, murderers rarely lived long enough for anyone to worry much
about whether they had been unjustly enriched.) There were only two
significant precedents, though neither was precisely on point. The first
was a decision of the United States Supreme Court three years earlier.
The issue in New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong1 5 was
whether the beneficiary of a life insurance policy was entitled to the proceeds after murdering the insured. The Court held without dissent that
the murderer could not recover the policy proceeds, even if he had originally obtained the policy for legitimate reasons. (There was some reason,
however to think that he had actually procured the policy in question
with murder in mind.) The ruling seemed to be based mostly on the
Court's sense of justice. As Justice Field said in his opinion for the Court:
[I]ndependently of any proof of the motives of [the beneficiary] in
obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were just and
proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its immediate
payment, he murdered the assured. It would be a reproach to the
jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money
payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken.
As well might he recover
insurance money upon a building that he
had willfully fired.1 6

13. This description of the facts is drawn from the majority and dissenting opinions, 22
N.E. at 188-89, 191 and the findings of the trial judge, quoted in the Appellant's Brief at 23, Riggs.
14. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CrN. L. REV.
803, 845 (1993).

15. 117 U.S. 591 (1886).
16. Id. at 600.
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Armstrong was admittedly a good precedent for the daughters in
Riggs, but it was decided strictly as a matter of common law, with no
applicable statute. Testamentary disposition of property, in contrast, is a
creation of statute, and there might be less room for the court's sense of
equity to operate.
The other case, which favored Elmer, was somewhat closer factually to
Riggs. A North Carolina court had been faced with the question of
whether a widow forfeited her statutory dower rights by conniving in the
murder of her husband. 17 The only statutory ground for forfeiting dowery was running off with another man. The court considered that ground
exclusive, on the theory that "it belongs to the law-making power alone
to prescribe additional grounds of forfeiture."'1 8 Property forfeitures for
crime, the court said, "are unknown to our law, nor does it intercept for
such cause the transmission of an intestate's property to heirs and distributees, nor can we recognize any such operating principle."' 19 The absence
of prior authority, the North Carolina court added, "affords a strong presumption against the proposition," and the court therefore decided the
issue "upon the reason of the thing."'20 The "reason of the thing," apparently being that property forfeitures should be implied.
Because the North Carolina case involved statutory property rules,
rather than common law, arguably it was more closely on point than the
Supreme Court's insurance case. But the North Carolina case was also
arguably distinguishable, besides having the defect of coming from a less
exalted forum than the United States Supreme Court. Because the North
Carolina case involved dower, which was outside the control of the testator, the testator's presumed intentions were irrelevant. In the testamentary context, however, it might be considered much more relevant that
the testator would presumably not have wanted his killer to inherit. If we
assume that the statute of wills, unlike the dower statute, is designed to
implement testator intent, the North Carolina case might be considered
beside the point.
Given the absence of controlling precedent, it is not surprising that the
daughters' brief in Riggs struck out for higher ground. "[I]t is for this
Court to decide," the brief said, "whether the unwritten law, founded
upon natural justice and public policy, is sufficient to prevent this murderer from reaping the benefits of his crime by the aid and protection of
the law."' 2' In a less ethereal moment, the brief also relied on the
Supreme Court's insurance ruling. 22 In contrast, Elmer's brief argued
that he was clearly entitled to the property under the will statute and that
it was not for the courts to increase the penalty for crime by creating
17. See Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794, 794 (N.C. 1888).

18. Id. at 795.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Appellants' Brief at 4, Riggs.
See id. at 8-9.
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additional forfeitures. 23 Neither brief cites the North Carolina case,
which may not have been accessible to the lawyers at that point.
Judge Earl wrote the majority opinion in Riggs.24 Unlike the lawyers,
he discussed the North Carolina case, but he considered it wrong in principle. 25 He also relied on New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong.26 As he saw it, the statutes regulating wills "if literally construed,
and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be
controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer. ' '27 But he saw
no reason to give the statutes this effect. "What could be more unreasonable," he asked, "than to suppose that it was the legislative intention in
the general laws passed for the orderly, peaceable, and just devolution of
property that they should have operation in favor of one who murdered
28
his ancestor that he might speedily come into possession of his estate?"
This legislative intent being "inconceivable," the court need not be constrained "by the general language contained in the laws."'2 9 "Besides," he
continued, "all laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their
operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common
30
law,"-here, the maxim that no one can profit from his own wrong.
These maxims "have their foundation in universal law administered in all
civilized countries," and in this particular setting were exemplified by the
31
codes of civil law countries denying murderers their inheritance.
As this brief description indicates, the majority opinion touches different chords. It mentions the legislature's presumptive intent and the ill
effects of a mechanical application of the statute of wills. It also relies on
overarching legal principles, said to be implicit in the common law and
the law of all civilized nations-an argument seemingly based on natural
law. It seems unclear, in short, whether the court was trying to carry out
the intent of the legislature in circumstances unforseen by the drafters or
was trying to impose its own notions of justice despite unhelpful legislation, or some hybrid of the two.
Judge Gray's dissent began by conceding that, if the matter were one of
conscience, he would have joined the majority. But instead, he said,
"[w]e are bound by the rigid rules of law, which have been established by
the legislature, and within the limits of which the determination of this
question is confined."'32 Disposition of property at death involves "matters of which the legislature has assumed the entire control, and has un23. See id. at 6-7.
24. For a discussion of how Riggs fit into the nineteenth century history of statutory
interpretation, see William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:A Study in
Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 822 (1985).
25. See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190-91.
26. 117 U.S. 599 (1886). See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
27. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
28. Id. at 190.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
32. Id. at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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dertaken to regulate with comprehensive particularity. ' 33 One
particularly troubling aspect of the case was the evidence that Elmer
killed Francis specifically to keep him from revoking his old will. Still,
Judge Gray said, there had been no actual revocation. The statute provides that: "No will in writing, except in the cases hereinafter mentioned,
nor any part thereof, shall be revoked or altered otherwise. ' 34 No such
methods of revocation having been used in the case at hand, "the will of
the testator is unalterable. '35 In effect, he concluded, the courts was being asked to write another will for Francis, to further punish Elmer for his
36
crime.
Like the majority opinion, Justice Gray's dissent is open to more than
one reading. His reliance on the revocation provision makes the dissent
sound to some extent like a plain-meaning interpretation of the wills statute. On the other hand, he also emphasizes the essentially statutory nature of wills law, seemingly suggesting that even apart from specific
statutory language there is no room for judge-made rules.
Whatever its rationale, Riggs has come to play an important role in
property transfer law. The result of a murder might be to position the
murderer to receive property directly from the victim, as in Riggs, or
through insurance or dower, as in the other cases discussed above. There
are also endless other permutations: joint tenancy, community property,
statutory forced shares, joint bank accounts, powers of appointment, contingent remainders, and other property interests limited only by the ingenuity of lawyers. Riggs has not merely been a precedent for the
interpretation of wills statutes, but for the treatment of this whole array
of property transfers to murderers. In this respect, it seems more akin to
a common law ruling than a reading of a particular New York statute.
Riggs became the foundation for what is now known as the slayer rule.
Once the issue was raised by the courts, the principle of Riggs was largely
accepted by legislatures. Except in nine states, the subject is now covered
mostly by statute. 37 With the possible exceptions of New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, every state accepts some version of the slayer rule, depriving the killer of the benefit of the victim's property. 3 8 But despite this
virtual consensus, many potential problems can arise. First, in a given
state, only certain situations may be covered by statute, raising the question whether the statute is the exclusive source of relief or other situa33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 192
Id.
See id. at 192-93.
See Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely A Matter of Equity, 71 IowA
L. REV. 489, 505 n.55 (1986); see also Charlotte K. Goldberg, Estate of Castiglioni: Spousal
Murder and the Clash of Joint Tenancy and Equity in CaliforniaCommunity Property Law,
33 IDAHo L. REv. 513 (1997) (discussing a case in which the court maneuvered around the
statutory slayer rule to avoid a situation in which a wife would have received a greater
share of property held in joint tenancy by killing him than she could have received by
divorcing him).
38. See Sherman, supra note 14, at 805.
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tions remain subject to judge-made doctrines. 39 Second, as mentioned
above, there are many possible transfers of property interests that may be
triggered by a death, and it is unclear whether they should all be treated
the same. It is often particularly difficult to determine whether the
slayer's entire interest should be forfeited and who the alternate taker of
the property should be.4 0 An additional twist occurs when the slayer kills
himself as well, so the dispute is between his heirs and those of the testator.41 Third, there is controversy about whether to apply the rule in cases
of mercy killing or assisted suicide. 42 In this context a court cannot rely
on a presumed intent of the victim to deny the killer the property; the
victim would presumably have no reason to disfavor a killer who acted at
his request. Fourth, where the property interest in question is created by
an employee-benefit plan, it is an open question whether federal law
preempts the state's slayer rule. The language of the federal preemption
provision is sweeping, but obviously was not written with homicidal beneficiaries in mind. The preemption issue is essentially a replay of Riggs in
43
federal court, with the ultimate outcome yet to be determined.
As my colleague Mary Louise Fellows points out, these complications
are not readily dispatched by simply invoking the maxim denying wrongdoers their ill-gotten gains. Instead, they require careful analysis of the
impact of a murder in a specific setting on the policies of the property
transfer system. 44 She criticizes Judge Gray for portraying the slayer rule
as an add-on to property transfer law rather than an intrinsic component
of our system for distributing property at death. 45 From the point of view
of property law, then, Riggs is neither a mere interpretation of a particular statute nor an equitable override of normal property rules. Instead, it
is part of a unified system of property law that bridges common law and
statute.

39. This is the focus of HART & SACKS, supra note 7. For a recent example, see Gallimore v. Washington, 666 A.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
40. See Fellows, supra note 37, at 504-05,521-38; see also Grayson M.P. McCouch, Will
Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1123, 1166-68
(1993) (discussing the effect of Uniform Probate Code revisions).
41. See Adam J. Katz, Case Comment, Heinzman v. Mason. A Decision Based in Equity but Not an Equitable Decision, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 441 (1999) (discussing a case
in which Indiana Court of Appeals held that when a husband murdered his wife, then
killed himself, his heirs are not entitled to inherit the deceased wife's intestate property).
42. See Sherman, supra note 14, at 808; see also Kent S. Berk, Comment, Mercy Killing
and the Slayer Rule: Should the Legislatures Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485
(1992).
43. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 907 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding preemption); Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees of Div. 1181, 709 F. Supp. 329, 33133 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding no preemption); see also Sherman, supra note 14, at 849 n.218
(proposing that the issue should be governed by federal common law of employee benefits); see also Robert D. McClure, Note Thou Shalt Not Kill (Thy Spouse): A Recent Exception to the ERISA Preemption Doctrine, 29 J. FAM. L. 129 (1990-1991).
44. See Fellows, supra note 37, at 490-96.
45. See id. at 552.
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COURTS AS MINI-LEGISLATURES

Assume for the moment that the statute of wills did not dictate any
answer in Riggs, so that the court had a clear field in which to consider
the issue. What method should a court used to decide such "open" questions of law?
One answer was given by H.L.A. Hart, the leading English legal philosopher of the past century. 46 His views are complex, but well encapsulated
by Ronald Dworkin in a summary of Hart's position:
The set of [existing] legal rules is exhaustive of 'the law,' so that if
someone's case is not clearly covered by such a rule (because there is
none that seems appropriate, or those that seem appropriate are
vague, or for some other reason) then that case cannot be decided by
'applying the law.' It must be decided by some official, like a judge,
'exercising his discretion,' which means reaching beyond the law for
some other sort of standard to guide him
in manufacturing a fresh
47
legal rule or supplementing an old one.
On this view, in the gaps where rules run out, the judge's function is
much like that of the legislature's, except for being confined in scope to
gap-filling. From a very different jurisprudential perspective, Judge Posner agrees with Hart that judicial gap-filling looks a great deal like legislation. Hard cases, he says, are "frequently indeterminate, rather than
merely difficult," so the judge is "bound to be making a value judgment
based on intuition and personal experience . . . rather than engaging
48
solely in ... some special mode of inquiry called 'legal reasoning."'
Ronald Dworkin has taken quite a different view. He argues that in
deciding open issues, courts do not reach outside the law, but instead rely
on broad principles that are contained within the legal system itself. One
of his main examples is Riggs, where "the court cited the principle that no
man may profit from his own wrong as a background standard against
which to read the statute of wills and in this way justified a new interpre'49
tation of that statute.
46. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT

47.

OF LAW

252, 272-73 (2d ed. 1994).

DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 17.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY

48.
96
(1999). Posner does not think that judges are thereby stepping "outside the law" because
he views the making of such value judgments under the appropriate circumstances as part
of their accepted institutional role.
49. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 28-29. As we will see in Part III, it is somewhat inappropriate to consider Riggs a statutory interpretation case, but Dworkin's main point relates to how courts fill gaps, not to how they read texts. Anthony D'Amato takes a similar
position that law includes general principles rather than only explicit rules. See Anthony
D'Amato, Elmer's Rule: A JurisprudentialDialogue, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1975).
Dworkin's more recent work continues to rely on Riggs, but in more complex ways. For a
discussion, see Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudenceof Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847,
851-52 (1987). For a recent critique of Dworkin's view of principles, see Larry Alexander
& Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles,82 IOWA L. REV. 739, 785 (1997) ("Legal methodology requires only two types of norms: correct moral principlesand posited legal rules. It
does not require legal principles.").
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Riggs does provide strong support for Dworkin. The majority seems to
be at great pains to show that its decision has a "legal" pedigree rather
than merely incorporating moral values. The opinion is replete with citations to legal authorities, including Blackstone, treatises on the law of
nations, the Supreme Court's opinion in the insurance case, Roman and
civil law, and state cases dealing with other inequitable conduct by beneficiaries. 50 A legislative committee report on the slayer rule would hardly
have found it necessary to provide such a legal pedigree for disinheriting
people who murder their benefactors. Of course, these citations may
merely be window-dressing to cover up a personal value judgment. For
the window dressing to have any effect, however, the judges must have
assumed their audience would view the citations as establishing a specifically "legal" principle available to the court. If they had been seeking
only support for their moral view (support that would have been largely
redundant), then citations to religious figures or moral tracts would have
seemed more appropriate.
Riggs cannot be taken as proof that judges always rely on a narrower
range of considerations than legislators. Nor does it prove that ascertainable legal principles, distinguishable from specific rules, actually do exist.
But it does show that judges believe in the existence of legal principles
that guide their decision when the rules run out (and believe that their
audience also prefers them to rely on such principles).
The analogy of judges to legislators is a useful corrective for formalism,
but it is an oversimplification. In reality, it seems implausible that judges
consider only "nonlegal" policies if no clear rule applies. The legislative
analogy assumes that true law consists exclusively of rules. This is a mistake that seems endemic among entering law students: they stubbornly
believe that "the law" consists of a rule book, which they need only memorize in order to become competent lawyers. Law school would be much
simpler if this were true, but in reality becoming a lawyer involves more
than simply learning a series of rules. Judges are deeply socialized in the
ways of the legal system. Even when no specific rule is exactly on point,
they are not likely to suddenly behave indistinguishably from economists,
public policy analysts, or moral philosophers. Nor is it likely that a transcript of the judges' conference on a case will be mistaken for the record
of a legislative committee meeting. This is not to minimize the reality
that judges do make policy, but to call them legislators is a metaphor
rather than a literal description of their decisionmaking. Dworkin's own
vision of judging may have other flaws, but he seems to be on solid
ground in distinguishing the role of judges in open cases from that of
legislators.
50. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (N.Y. 1889). The breadth of the citations
is particularly impressive due to the court's extremely heavy workload, which is said to
have led four members of the Court during this period to "work themselves to death."
Judith S. Kaye, "Year in Review" Shows Court of Appeals Continuing Its Great Traditions,
42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 331, 333 (1998).

SMU LAW REVIEW
III.

[Vol. 53

TEXTUALISM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In the previous section, we considered the extent to which judges resemble legislators when they are filling gaps in the law. But this assumes,
of course, that there is a gap, so that the case is not covered by some
existing rule as properly interpreted. Apart from its statutory context,
Riggs would have been an easy case, like the Supreme Court's insurance
decision. It was only the chilling effect of legislative activity on judicial
policymaking that made Riggs a problem at all.
To understand the legislation problem posed by Riggs, we must begin
by considering recent debates over statutory interpretation. Most readers
of this Symposium probably have at least a passing familiarity with those
debates and with the revival of textualism. For the benefit of newcomers,
however, the next two paragraphs offer a brief overview.
The conventional approach to statutory interpretation involves an eclectic mix of reliance on text, legislative history, precedent, canons of interpretation, and policy. 51 In the 1980s, formalists such as Justice Scalia
mounted a challenge to this conventional approach in favor of a much
more structured method of statutory interpretation. 52 As William Eskridge has explained, "[flormalism posits that judicial interpreters can
and should be tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute; if unelected judges exercise much discretion in these
cases, democratic governance is threatened. '53 Formalists stress that the
proper forum for policy making in a democratic society is the legislature.
They are dubious of the concept of legislative intent: "Legislation is compromise. Compromises have no spirit; they just are."' 54 Hence, when the
legislature has failed to speak clearly to an issue, it is useless for a court to
try to fill the gap. Nor should courts consult legislative history in a vain
effort to determine legislative intent. 55 Knowing that courts will follow
only their plain language, legislators will have an incentive to draft carefully and precisely. 56 What this adds up to is, as Judge Easterbrook puts
51. For a fuller discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). A good description of
the conventional judicial approach can be found in ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997).
52. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 18-23 (1997); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994). For a recent overview of the debate, see Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The PublicJustification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999).

53. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 646 (1990).
54. Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 68. For more on Easterbrook's views, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 87 (1984).

55. See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable
Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998).
56. See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1992).
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'57
it, "a relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation.
The new textualism has not gone unchallenged. 58 Critics have attacked
virtually every premise of textualist theory. Perhaps more significantly,
even those critics who sympathize with textualist goals attack the implementation of the formalist program by judges. They charge that courts
have "begun to use textualist methods of construction that routinely allow them to attribute 'plain meaning' to statutory language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally inconsistent," and
even to attribute plain meaning to language that "was nearly universally
believed to have a contrary meaning for many decades. 59 Others describe
the new textualism as increasing the tension between democracy and the
rule of law and serving "as a cover for the injection of conservative values
into statutes." 6
Read against the background of today's debate, Riggs may seem a
good test case for textualist interpretation. The Riggs dissent seemingly
echoes the textualist axiom that "[w]e are not free to ignore or augment
the legislature's words just because we think it would have said something
'
The majority, in contrast, apparently sets
else, had it but thought of it."61
aside the language of the statute to rely on its purpose. Viewed as a statutory interpretation case, then, Riggs looks very much like a replay of
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, in which the Court held that a
minister, so
statute banning the import of employees did not apply to a 62
ruling in order to avoid what it considered an absurd result.
Indeed, Riggs has been given exactly this reading by some distinguished commentators. Reed Dickerson characterizes the Riggs court as
applying "an exception even though the wills and the intestacy laws of the
state recited none," basing the exception on the tacit assumptions of the
legislators. 63 Similarly, Judge Posner views the court as having grafted

57. Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 67. For a more detailed analysis of formalism, see
Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert Reasoning,
Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (1999).
58. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLIcr 182-90
(1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509
(1998); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 549-54 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T.
Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:Mourning the Death of Originalism
in Statutory Interpretation,68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 825-31 (1994).
59. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752
(1995).
60. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994).
61. Justice Alex Kozinski, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 1876, 1878 (1999).
62. 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892). For discussion of Holy Trinity, see SCALIA, supra note 52,
at 18-20; Carol Chomsky, The True History of the Holy Trinity (Case), COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (on file with author); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833
(1998).
63. Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFs'nr L. REV. 1125, 1153 (1983).
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"an exception onto the statute, the better to carry out.., the desires the
legislators would have had regarding the question if they had foreseen
it." 64 More recently, Posner has remarked that to "interpret the statute
as entitling the murderer to inherit would have disserved the intentions of
testators, the principal interest that the statute protects; it would have
been a goofy interpretation. '6 5 So Riggs looks like a classic conflict between the letter and the spirit of the law.
It is not surprising that our reading of Riggs should connect with contemporary concerns about textualism. But this reading, while not completely without support in the opinion, risks distorting the real stakes in
the Riggs. Although it is a seemingly natural approach to the case, we
would probably do better to resist viewing Riggs as a case about
textualism.
To begin with, if the question is textualism, we ought to be able to
identify the specific text in question. If the conflict is between the letter
and spirit of the law, after all, we should be able to point out the "letter"
at issue. But statutory language seems to play only a secondary role in
Riggs. The majority refers to no specific statutory provisions whatsoever.
The dissent does refer to a provision on will-revocation, but seems to be
addressing mostly the argument that Elmer intentionally prevented Francis from revoking the will. The revocation provision is much less relevant
to the broader question of whether a killer, apart from any specific intent
to prevent revocation, should be allowed to benefit under the victim's
will. Nor do the briefs focus on any particular language from the statute.
Thus, specific statutory provisions seem generally peripheral to the argument, much more so than we would expect if the judges and the parties
had conceptualized the issue in terms of fidelity to text. Mimicking Stanley Fish, one is tempted to ask, "Is there a text in this case?" 6 6 The answer seems to be no.
The case's procedural posture is another reason for questioning
whether the decision should be considered an "interpretation" of the
wills statute. Francis's daughters did not attempt to prevent the probate
of the will and the distribution of the estate. Instead, they sought an injunction against Elmer requiring him to turn over the property. The will
statute does not dictate what happens to property after probate ends. If
we are going to be true formalists, then, the statute does not even apply.
(And if we are not going to be formalists, of course, Riggs is an easy
case.)
Finally, viewing the problem as one of statutory interpretation provides
no guidance in the post-Riggs slayer cases. In Holy Trinity, the Court had
only to construe a statutory term ("labor or service") as having no appli64. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 106-07 (1990).
65. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra
note 48, at 140.
66. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
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cation to ministers. Slayer issues come in many permutations and may
require judicial ingenuity in devising appropriate remedies. If we want,
we can say that in these various cases, the court is interpreting the intestacy statutes, the common law of insurance contracts, the statute of wills,
the statutes covering joint ownership of property, and the federal employee benefits statute, though none of these sources of law may happen
to say a word about the situation. Realistically, however, except where
they have been amended to specifically address the slayer rule, the statutes have little to do with the court's task. We can call this a problem in
statutory "interpretation," if we like, but attaching this label does not
seem much to advance the analysis.
For these reasons, the current textualism debate seems ultimately beside the point in Riggs, despite its initial appearance of relevance. There
was no specific statutory provision that would address the availability of
injunctive relief against Elmer. Thus, the problem was not one of statutory interpretation, in the sense of attaching meaning to specific statutory
language. The objection to Riggs is that the court may have undermined
a legislative goal of completely defining the legal effect of wills. But this
is a functional objection, not a textual one. A true formalist would have
no problem with the result in Riggs because the statute was not directly
applicable anyway.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION OF THE COMMON LAW

The Supreme Court's insurance decision was seemingly noncontroversial because no statute threatened to impinge on the Court's common law
authority. Riggs, in contrast, was a far more difficult case because the
subject of wills is dominated by statute. The worry was seemingly not so
much that any particular statutory provision was inconsistent with the result in Riggs, but rather that the legislature had preempted the field. The
issue of field preemption of the common law by legislation seems to have
received little attention-much less attention than that of statutory interpretation strictly defined-but Riggs is far from unique in raising it.67
Consider two examples at the federal level. 68 The first involves interstate water pollution. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee [Milwaukee 1],69
67. An analogous situation involves federal preemption of an entire field, so that even
state regulations consistent with specific federal requirements are preempted. See
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). For an overview, see 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-31, at 1204-12 (3d ed. 2000).
But the federal preemption issue is obviously connected with issues of federalism that have
no parallel when the legislature and court in question are part of the same level of
government.
68. These two examples are discussed at greater length in Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public

Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 888-905 (1991). For a different perspective on some of these
issues, see Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement,and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U.

L. REv. 767, 785-91 (1991).
69. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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the Supreme Court ruled that nuisance suits for interstate pollution could
be brought under the federal common law of nuisance. Soon after that
ruling, Congress substantially revamped the federal water pollution statute, creating a much more comprehensive regulatory scheme. Almost a
decade later, the Milwaukee litigation returned to the Supreme Court. In
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois [Milwaukee 11],70 the Court held that the
amendments preempted the federal common law of nuisance. The Court
reasoned that the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme left no room
for ad hoc judicial supervision of polluters. 71 Although the Court's decision was partly based on considerations of federalism, a New York court
adopted similar reasoning to cut back on state nuisance law, reasoning
that the public interest in controlling pollution was better pursued
72
through the administrative process.
A second example comes from admiralty law. Congress has created a
complex statutory scheme governing tort recovery by maritime workers.
The statutes were in part prompted by a flaw in the common law, which
did not allow recovery for wrongful death. But the scheme had gaps, as
one woman discovered when her husband was killed by an unseaworthy
vessel just offshore. One statute covered only negligence but not unseaworthiness; another covered unseaworthiness but only for accidents on
the high seas. Undeterred, the Supreme Court created a new common
law remedy on her behalf, in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., overruling the old common law rule against recovery for wrongful death. 73 In a
thoughtful opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court concluded that the statutes were not an attempt to address comprehensively, and thereby freeze,
the entire field of recovery for maritime torts. Thus, the statutes did not
preempt further common law development. Later cases, however, reflect
progressively increasing concern that assertive application of the common
74
law could tamper with the statutory scheme.
This issue is not limited to the federal law. Consider a third example,
involving state law. The Uniform Commercial Code provides remedies
for buyers of defective products, but because of their origins in contract
law, these remedies are sometimes less generous than tort law might provide. Some courts have rejected the more expansive tort remedy for fear
of upsetting the U.C.C.'s remedial scheme. 75 So great is this concern that
70. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
71. In retrospect, this holding seems ill-considered. See Farber & Frickey, supra note
68, at 892-95. But see Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on Meiners &
Yandle, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 965, 967 (1999) (defending Milwaukee II as a safeguard
against protectionist litigation by state governments).
72. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
73. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
74. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
75. See McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987);
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990); Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v.
Chief Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 1409 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Minnesota law). For further

discussion of the "economic loss" rule, see W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE707-10 (5th ed. 1984); Christopher Scott D'Angelo, The Eco-
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in a diversity case, the Eighth Circuit has even applied the doctrine to bar
recovery for outright fraud. 76 One wonders how that court would have
decided Riggs.
The issue of field preemption of the common law is surely ripe for
more systematic treatment, but some preliminary observations may be
useful. It would be unreasonable to assume that every statute is designed
to completely preempt the common law in every transaction governed in
any respect by that statute. But it would be equally unreasonable to assume that the scope for common law creativity is unaffected by comprehensive legislative treatment of the same subject matter. Although
sharply defined standards for field preemption seem unlikely, we can at
least point to several relevant factors.
First, courts sometimes assume unreflectively that a statute was meant
as a definitive statement of the balance between opposing interests,
thereby freezing current common law in place outside of those boundaries. In reality, as Moragne illustrates, the limits of the statute may not
represent any judgment about what rules should prevail outside those
limits. The legislature may simply have decided to take a specific step at
a given time, with no desire to preclude further common law development. This may be especially true when the statute was prompted by a
perceived defect in the common law. The desire of the legislature to correct this defect in its most egregious form carries no implication of an
intent to freeze the common law in its defective form elsewhere. Some
statutes do represent a global balance between opposing values or political forces, but not many.
Second, the nature of the statute is also important. A tightly integrated
structure like the U.C.C. or the federal pollution laws may be upset by illconsidered judicial innovations regarding matters within their scope.
Simpler statutes are less likely to experience unforseen repercussions
from well-intended efforts at filling gaps. The hodgepodge of statutes
governing recovery by injured maritime workers seems to be at the opposite end of the spectrum from the highly integrated code.
Third, statutes also differ in their purposes. Some statutes are designed
to channel transactions or to provide clear rules in order to minimize disputes. Others have different priorities, less likely to be disrupted by innovations in adjacent areas of the common law. When faced by particular
cases where the statutory scheme seems inadequate, courts may lose
track of the systemic value of a rule-based regime. In any event, to minimize disruption, the court must keep an eye to the policies promoted by
the statute, giving them generous consideration in crafting common law
rules outside the scope of the statute itself.
nomic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law from Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26
U. TOL. L. REv. 591 (1995); Comment, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Loss Doctrine, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 277 (1987).
76. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Minnesota law).
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Based on these three factors, the decision in Riggs seems correct. The
statute of wills is far from being a comprehensive scheme governing family property transfers or even the implementation of testamentary devises. We have no reason to think that the traditional wills statute (as
opposed, perhaps, to today's Uniform Probate Code) was designed as an
all-encompassing treatment of the entire subject of property transfer at
death. Most importantly, the court's holding was entirely consistent with
the main purpose of the statute, which was to provide an efficient means
of property transfer at death. Enforcing a devise to the testator's murderer is unlikely to strike many drafters of wills as a helpful aid in implementing their estate plan. The only negative is that the slayer rule is a
potential source of litigation, and therefore might increase the transaction
costs of testamentary dispositions. But given the rarity with which plausible murder claims could be made against beneficiaries, this seems like a
minor concern. Overall, then, the Riggs court seems rather clearly to
have resolved the preemption issue correctly.
Harkening back to our earlier discussion of "gap filling," it may be
helpful to analogize to the problem of filling a physical gap. Consider the
problem of what to do with an open lot. The lot may be too small to
allow any new building-the existing development has literally "preempted the field." Or it may be that potential construction is tightly constrained by the surrounding development and the available infrastructure.
In that situation, the developer's problem is clearly defined by the existing physical context. To be a little metaphorical, we might say his solution was based on his "reading" of the conditions at the site. To the
extent he views those conditions as not merely a constraint but an opportunity to contribute to the overall development of the neighborhood, we
might even applaud his solution as a creative "interpretation" of the surrounding context. In yet another scenario, the development is located
away from existing construction, giving the developer a free hand to pursue his own ideas. Here, the analogy is to the unvarnished common law.
As in architecture, so in law, there are many kinds of "gaps," imposing
varying degrees of constraint on new development. Riggs was an important step in learning to deal with this problem.
At one level, Riggs merely presented a technical problem in the law of
wills, providing a solution that has been greatly refined over the years.
But apart from specialists in property transfer law, that is not why we
remember Riggs today. The larger question in Riggs was how courts and
legislatures would relate to each other in the coming age of statutes. It
must have been clear, even then, that the legislatures would be more and
more in charge of creating public policy. The question was whether,
faced by this trend, courts would abandon their traditional role entirely.
Perhaps it is a bit ironic that the court chose to address this issue in a case
involving a statute of ancient lineage, rather than a modern enactment.
But it was with the new wave of statutes that the issue would be most
critical.
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To shift metaphors, the issue facing the courts was the working relationship between the legislature and the judiciary. Riggs was an early
indication of the recognition that the legislature needed neither a competitor nor a lackey, but an active junior partner. For that contribution,
Riggs well deserves its place in the legal canon.
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